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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED P. ADAMS, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent^ ) 
vs. ': CASE NO. 14281 
) 
FIRST STATE BANK, 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff and Respon-
dent, Fred P. Adams (hereinafter !fADAMSff) who was the pur-
chaser of a boat from Deseret Manufacturing Corporation 
(hereinafter ffDESERETn) a now bankrupt borrower of Defen-
dant and Appellant, First State Bank (hereinafter "BANK") 
which held a Financing Statement filed with the Secretary 
of State and other documents under the Uniform Commercial 
Code securing Bank's loan to Deserete The dispute concerns 
validity of the Financing Statement. Adams demands damages 
for the Bank's "wrongful taking" and withholding of posses -
sion of the boat. 
-1-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court granted a Summary Judgment to Adams 
holding that a one-digit error in the serial number of the 
boat was fatally defective in the Financing Statement; 
that the Bank had no security interest in the boat; and 
that the Bank was liable in damages to Adams for "wrongful 
taking" of it. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
On a Petition under Rule 72(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this Court granted this Interlocutory Appeal 
and the Bank now asks for a reversal of the Trial Court's 
Summary Judgment which held the Bank's Financing Statement 
void. 
STATElffiNO^-^^ 
The boat in dispute was owned, having been manufac-
tured by Deseret, a Defendant in the original action which 
does not appeal but is now bankrupt (R.68-70), Deseret 
gave the Bank a Security Agreement (R.39) and a Financing 
Statement which was filed with the Utah Secretary of State 
August 5, 1974 (R.40). The Financing Statement described 
a Seaflite 2200 Offshore #DMFA0082M~75L (R.39-40), 
The actual number appearing on the boat is DMFA0082M-
74-L (R.104). 
However, the Financing Statement described the engine 
number of the boat with precise accuracy, viz; WLD-VS-L16-
-n n nM 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
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boat was fatally defective in the Financing Statement; 
that the Bank had no security interest in the boat; and 
that the Bank was liable in damages to Adams for "wrongful 
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Summary Judgment which held the Bank's Financing Statement 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The boat in dispute was owned, having been manufac-
tured by Deseret, a Defendant in the original action which 
does not appeal but is now bankrupt (R.68-70) Deseret 
gave the Bank a Security Agreement (R.39) and a Financing 
Statement which was filed with the Utah Secretary of State 
August 5, 1974 (R.40). The Financing Statement described 
a Seaflite 2200 Offshore #DMFA0Q82M~75L (R. 3-9-40). 
The actual number appearing on the boat is DMFA0082M-
74-L (R.104). 
However, the Financing Statement described the engine 
number of the boat with precise accuracy, viz: WLD-VS-L16-
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The make of the boat is ffSeaflite" as appears in 
both the Financing Statement and on the boat and the manu-
facture of the engine is Waukesha as appears on the Finan-
cing Statement (R.40) and on the boat (R.103).".-
Adams did business as the sole proprietor of "FASCO" 
(apparently a contraction of his name) and was a trade sup-
plier of Deseret, selling them materials for the construct-
ion of boats (R.2). Deseret became substantially indebted 
to Adams, doing business as FASCO, and attempted to pay him 
with checks that did not clear the bank (R,3). 
Some time after August 8, 1974, and considerably 
after the bank had filed its Financing Statement, Deseret 
issued an invoice to "FASCO" for the boat in question as 
well as other boats (R.103). The deposition of Adams was 
taken and he could not produce any invoice for the boat in 
question but did exhibit the one appearing at R.103 saying 
that the invoice on the boat in question was "like this" an 
admitting that the invoice on the boat in question would 
have been issued to him (as "FAS-CO") at even a later date 
than August 8, 1974 (Deposition of Fred Adams, p,18). 
Adams never made any investigation with the Secre-
tary of State to determine whether there was a Financing 
Statement on the boat until after he had been advised that 
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First State Bank (Manti Branch) had a lien on the boat 
(Adams Deposition pe2S, 29). 
The invoice at R.103 clearly indicates that the con-
sideration which Adams or nFASCO!l paid was an antecedent 
indebtedness but that is not an issue before this Court 
since the Trial Court reserved as an issue of fact and law 
whether or not Adams was a buyer in the ordinary course of 
business or acquired the boat because of an antecedent debt 
(R.90). That reserved issue became naturally immaterial as 
far as the Trial Court was concerned since he found the one-
digit error to be a jurisdictional and fatal defect nullify-
ing entirely the Bank's security interest - irrespective of 
the "ordinary course of business" rule. 
The boat was received by Adams long after the Finan-
cing Statement was filed (Adams Deposition p.18). 
Adams took delivery of several boats from Deseret and 
received "roughly $12,000.00 in cash" from sale of boats 
other than the one in question here which Adams retained for 
his own use (Adams Deposition p.31). 
There is one important direct conflict in the evidence 
and therefore an issue of fact precluding summary judgment 
for Adams, as two witnesses whose depositions were published 
-4-
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and reviewed by the Trial Court in the Summary Judgment pro-
ceeding testified that both of the witnesses advised Adams 
that First State Bank had a lien on the boat (Deposition 
of Lynn Nuffer, p.14, lines 6 and 7; p.70, lines 20-25; 
Deposition of Steven Tapp, p.11, lines 8-10). 
When the Bank confronted officers of Deseret about 
the wrongful disposal of the Bank's security, Deseretfs 
principal officers and stockholders, Lynn Nuffer and Steven 
Tapp, called First State Bank and asked if they should pick 
up one boat and return it to their place of business. They 
were instructed by the Bank to return the Bank's security 
(Deposition of Steven Tapp, p.18,19; Deposition of Lynn 
Nuffer, p.33-35). The boat was picked up by Nuffer and Tapp* 
and not by the Bank (Deposition of Lynn Nuffer, p.34 and 35). 
fit should be noted parenthetically here that a 
secured party has the statutory right to require the debtor 
to assemble the collateral and make it available to the 
secured party at a place to be designated by the secured 
party (70A-9-503) after default.J 
First State Bank had taken judgment against Deseret 
Manufacturing (R.ll) and the note was in default (R.64). 
-5-
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED lii RULING THAT 
A ONE-DIGIT ERROR IN A FILED FINAN-
CING STATEMENT UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE 
The decision of the Trial Court that a one-digit 
error is a fatal defect is clearly erroneous under the 
Uniform Commercial Code adopted by Utah effective January 
1, 1966. 
That proposition is unequivocally established by 
every case decided under the UCC which has considered the 
issue. In a well-reasoned and authoritative decision, the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Still Associates, Inc. vs. 
Murphy, 26 7 NE2d 217 carefully reviewed all decisions of all 
other jurisdictions to rule upon the question under the Uni-
form Commercial Code and its conclusion was to overrule one 
of its prior decisions of long standing handed down under the 
old "chattel mortgage11 law, a field of legislation and case 
law which now, the Massachusetts Court holds, is superseded 
entirely by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
In Still Associates the facts are virtually the same 
as here. The Court stated that "the Defendant [buyer of the 
personal property under the code filing] had no.actual notice 
and acted in good faith11. The Issue in question in this 
Massachusetts case was a one-digit error in the Financing 
-6-
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Statement description of a motor vehicle. 
The unanimous opinion in Still Associates held: 
Notice Filing [The central filing provided 
by the Uniform Commercial Code] is a 
method of protecting security interests 
which at the same time would give subse-
quent potential creditors and other inter-
ested persons information and procedures 
adequate to enable the ascertainment of 
the facts they needed to know. 
The Court then recites its own decision of National 
Cash Register vs. Reston, 346 Mass. 255, 261; 191 NE2d 471. 
The Court held that under the kfbroad purposes of the Act 
[the UCC]" validity of the Financing Statement was not 
affected by the mistake in the last digit of the serial 
number. r 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court goes on to say: 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held 
much less to be sufficient: General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. vs. Terra Costa 
Corp., 161 NILS 941 fholding that the term 
"motor vehicle11 was sufficient). Given a 
sufficient description, the mere fact of an 
erroneous serial number following it cannot 
be held to be "seriously misleading". Bank 
of North America vs. Bank of Nutley, 94 NJ 
SUPR. 220-227, 227 Atl.2d A2d 535. 
The Massachusetts Court had this to say concerning 
the holdings under the Uniform Commercial Code: 
It has been held that the requirement of 
listing by serial number had been taken 
away by the Uniform Commercial Code and, 
in fact, a description of automobiles as 
being passenger and commercial automobiles 
~7-
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financed by a bank is sufficient (quoting 
Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank vs. Warren 
Leppley Ford Co,, IS PA D&C2d 119), 
The Intermediate Court of Appeals had held the Finan-
cing Statement fatally defective because of the one-digit 
error the same as the Trial Court has done here. The Inter-
mediate Court of Appeals had relied upon a 1924 decision 
of Massachusetts, Wise vs. Kennedy^ 248 Mass. 83s 142 NE 
7453 which had held: : 
It is common knowledge * * * that cars of any 
number of the makers can be distinguished 
with reasonable certainly for another auto-
mobile of the same class only by the number 
by which each car is designated. 
Although Wise vs. Kennedy had been followed extens-
ively in Massachusetts the Court of that state in Still 
Associates held that: 
It is implicit in the holding that Wise vs. 
Kennedy is no longer to be followed * * * 
The requirement of a description of collateral 
is evidentiary. The test of sufficiency of a 
description laid down by Code Section 9-402(5) 
[our 70A-9-405(5)] is that the description do 
the job assigned to it - that it makes pos-
sible by identification of the thing described. 
Under this rule Courts should refuse to allow 
the holdings often found in older chattel mort-
gage cases, that descriptions are insufficient 
unless they are of the most exact and detailed 
nature, the so-called "serial number11 test. 
It is also interesting to note the American Law Insti-
tute1 s "1962 Official Text with Comments" published by the 
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Law under Section 9-110 has 
Q-. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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exactly the same statement as that adopted by the Massachus-
etts Supreme Court (Page 633 Uniform Commercial Code, Offi-
cial Text with Comments of the ALI and National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). 
Nearer to home the Oklahoma case of Central National 
Bank and Trust Co. of Enid vs. Community Bank and Trust Co. 
of Enid (Okla 1974) 528 P2d 710, adopts exactly the same hold-
ing, stating that the "serial number" test has been dis-
carded by the UCC and that if the Financing Statement makes 
possible (by pursuing means which a reasonable person would 
be put on inquiry to ask about) the identification of the 
thing covered by the Financing Statement it will not be 
fatally defective. 
In the case of Yantze Brothers Co. vs. D.E.H. Sierra, 
Inc., 108 Ga.App. 875, 134 SE2d 828, the Court said that 
merely stating an incorrect serial number would not vitiate 
the contract if the key to identity of the property is there. 
JU -JU «JU ?* /\ /v 
A person of ordinary prudency would have found out 
from such lines of inquiry as the date given in the mort-
gage would naturally suggest to his mind and additionally 
any further information actually possessed by the claimants 
at the time of their transaction which would have led an 
-9. 
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ordinary man to believe that he was dealing with the mort-
gaged property or would ordinarily have led him to further 
inquiry * * *. 
Under Code Section 9-110 [Utahfs 70A-9-110] the 
description of the property is not required to be specific 
and under 9-208 [Utah's 70A-9-208] the debtor has means of 
obtaining from the secured party the statement of both the 
amount owing and the correct identification of the collat-
eral. 
Girard (supra) holds that the Uniform Commercial 
Code has: 
Removed the necessity of listing by serial 
number the property used as collateral in a 
security agreement. 
Of substantial interest in the Massachusetts case of 
Still Associates, Inc., vs. Murphy is the holding that; 
When the error is not on its face suffi-
ciently serious to invalidate the Finan-
cing Statement, it appears proper to us 
to require the party seeking to invalidate 
it under 9-402(5) [Utah's 70A~8~402(5)] 
to make some showing of actual prejudice * 
Of particular interest is the separate opinion of 
Justice Crockett in the very recent decision of Melville 
vs. Salt Lake County, 536 P2d 133 including the footnote 
citing Miller vs. Salt Lake City, 7 U2d 300, 410 P2d 764 
to the effect that anyone who has actual notice and suffered 
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no disadvantage cannot complaint of defects in the notice. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
We respectfully submit that the foregoing cases 
adequately demonstrate the clear error of the Trial Court 
in holding the Financing Statement fatally defective. The 
difficulty is that he has not only ruled against the Bank 
as far as its security interest goes, but has also left 
the necessity to try a protracted case on the question of 
damages, liability for which is absent if the correct rule 
is followed. 
We respectfully submit that the Court should reverse 
the ruling of the Trial Court and permit First State Bank 
to retain its possession of the security which it has law-
fully taken into custody for the purpose of realizing upon 
its statutory security interest. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ken Chamberlain 
Olsen & Chamberlain 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
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